As a result of technology causing virtually everything to be computer generated to a certain extent nowadays, sometimes the law lags behind the technology. This could work to everyone's benefit at least in the short term with the switch over to "E tickets" in place of the old handwritten UTTs.
The tickets now being issued are generated by computer in the officer's vehicle. The technology has included an "e signature" at the bottom of the ticket. However, the technology for "e signing" involves the signature being preprinted on the blank forms in the computer which are filled out after the traffic stop. That means that the officer is affiming the information about the ticket is valid BEFORE the information is even inputted onto the form by the computer. Therefore, the officer is "affirming" the facts about an offense before those facts are even known.
Such tickets, at least for now, are subject to dismissal on the consitutional grounds that your due process rights have been violated as the result of a fatal defect in the accusatory instrument, the "pre-signed" e-ticket, which still requires an actual original signature be affixed after the document is generated.
One way that the tickets have been found to be valid is if you ask for a supporting deposition and the officer actually signs that document. More and more tickets, however, have been printed with a supporting depostion being generated by the same software and at the same time, thereby containing another e-signature.
The software currently under contract with the State is called "TRACX" and is capable of being updated to correct these due process errors. However, this argument has been accepted by the local courts recently and I would encourage its use for all those offenders among us who need a little extra leverage to get a good plea deal.
For those of you looking for a more formal recitation of this argument, I will provide a more detailed analysis below but due to its length I figured I would provide a synopsis first to satisfy anyone with ADD.
The following is taken from the case of People v. Rose
11 Misc.3d 200, 805 N.Y.S.2d 506, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25526
Under the TRACX system, the police car must be equipped with a computer terminal, a printer and a bar code scanner which also functions as a digital imager. When issuing a ticket under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, a trooper clicks on the computer screen icon to enter the program and types in his or her user name and personal password. The computer then brings up the appropriate template which is immediately populated with information unique to that trooper including the trooper's electronic signature which he or she had previously scanned into the computer. At that point, the e-ticket is blank in many respects and does not contain any information relating specifically to the individual being ticketed. Using the bar code on the defendant's license and registration, the officer scans them electronically inserting on the ticket information relating to the driver and the car stopped. After the template is populated with that data, the Trooper manually inserts information regarding the type of arrest, location of the offense, section of law violated (including MPH if appropriate), court data and future date of the defendants appearance to answer the ticket. Once all the data has been entered, the Trooper checks a button to validate the ticket, a process which alerts the trooper to any mis-entries and provides an opportunity for the trooper to correct any errors. After any corrections have been made, the trooper clicks on validate. According to the testimony at the hearing, validating the ticket is not the same as electronically signing it. Once the ticket has been validated, a copy is printed out for the driver. It is only when the ticket is printed that the information is “locked” in the computer and cannot be altered by the trooper or his or her supervisors. If multiple tickets are issued to the driver, the trooper has the option to click on the button marked “replicate” and a copy of the ticket appears already populated with trooper, driver, car, location and court information to which the trooper can then add the specific section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law allegedly violated. After the trooper's tour of duty all simplified informations issued are downloaded into the computer at the state police substation and through a series of network connections are distributed to OCA and DMV among others.
The e-ticket is “signed” before any information regarding the traffic stop is placed on the ticket. Thus, the arresting officer is signing an essentially blank document. If a simplified information was required by law to be verified, this distinction alone would be fatal to an e-ticket since the signature affirms only what appears before it in the document. In the case of e-tickets, the arresting officer would be affirming nothing specifically relating to the motorist, the vehicle or the offense allegedly committed since none of that information is entered on the e-ticket until after is electronically signed. Since the commissioner's rules indicate that an arresting officer's signature on a UTT “constitutes the affirmation of the information under penalty of perjury,” the absence of such a provision in the rules relating to e-tickets is troubling to the court.
Since the Criminal Procedure Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law defer in great measure to the Motor Vehicle Commissioner's rule making authority, the most expedient changes may be accomplished by amending the rules relating to e-tickets. Specifically, the rules should describe in detail the form of the ticket to make it clear that it is one-sided and in one color. The rules should set forth a type size and location on the e-ticket for notice with regard to how one may appear and answer a ticket as well as sanctions which may be imposed for failure to appear. More importantly, the rules should require that the last act by an officer issuing an e-ticket should be to click on an “I affirm” button on the computer which is preceded on the screen by a form notice which mirrors that on the simplified information that indicates it is “affirmed under penalty of perjury.” As Lt. Casper candidly admitted at the hearing, there is no reason why the software can't be re-programmed to accomplish such an affirmation.
The tickets now being issued are generated by computer in the officer's vehicle. The technology has included an "e signature" at the bottom of the ticket. However, the technology for "e signing" involves the signature being preprinted on the blank forms in the computer which are filled out after the traffic stop. That means that the officer is affiming the information about the ticket is valid BEFORE the information is even inputted onto the form by the computer. Therefore, the officer is "affirming" the facts about an offense before those facts are even known.
Such tickets, at least for now, are subject to dismissal on the consitutional grounds that your due process rights have been violated as the result of a fatal defect in the accusatory instrument, the "pre-signed" e-ticket, which still requires an actual original signature be affixed after the document is generated.
One way that the tickets have been found to be valid is if you ask for a supporting deposition and the officer actually signs that document. More and more tickets, however, have been printed with a supporting depostion being generated by the same software and at the same time, thereby containing another e-signature.
The software currently under contract with the State is called "TRACX" and is capable of being updated to correct these due process errors. However, this argument has been accepted by the local courts recently and I would encourage its use for all those offenders among us who need a little extra leverage to get a good plea deal.
For those of you looking for a more formal recitation of this argument, I will provide a more detailed analysis below but due to its length I figured I would provide a synopsis first to satisfy anyone with ADD.
The following is taken from the case of People v. Rose
11 Misc.3d 200, 805 N.Y.S.2d 506, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25526
Under the TRACX system, the police car must be equipped with a computer terminal, a printer and a bar code scanner which also functions as a digital imager. When issuing a ticket under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, a trooper clicks on the computer screen icon to enter the program and types in his or her user name and personal password. The computer then brings up the appropriate template which is immediately populated with information unique to that trooper including the trooper's electronic signature which he or she had previously scanned into the computer. At that point, the e-ticket is blank in many respects and does not contain any information relating specifically to the individual being ticketed. Using the bar code on the defendant's license and registration, the officer scans them electronically inserting on the ticket information relating to the driver and the car stopped. After the template is populated with that data, the Trooper manually inserts information regarding the type of arrest, location of the offense, section of law violated (including MPH if appropriate), court data and future date of the defendants appearance to answer the ticket. Once all the data has been entered, the Trooper checks a button to validate the ticket, a process which alerts the trooper to any mis-entries and provides an opportunity for the trooper to correct any errors. After any corrections have been made, the trooper clicks on validate. According to the testimony at the hearing, validating the ticket is not the same as electronically signing it. Once the ticket has been validated, a copy is printed out for the driver. It is only when the ticket is printed that the information is “locked” in the computer and cannot be altered by the trooper or his or her supervisors. If multiple tickets are issued to the driver, the trooper has the option to click on the button marked “replicate” and a copy of the ticket appears already populated with trooper, driver, car, location and court information to which the trooper can then add the specific section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law allegedly violated. After the trooper's tour of duty all simplified informations issued are downloaded into the computer at the state police substation and through a series of network connections are distributed to OCA and DMV among others.
The e-ticket is “signed” before any information regarding the traffic stop is placed on the ticket. Thus, the arresting officer is signing an essentially blank document. If a simplified information was required by law to be verified, this distinction alone would be fatal to an e-ticket since the signature affirms only what appears before it in the document. In the case of e-tickets, the arresting officer would be affirming nothing specifically relating to the motorist, the vehicle or the offense allegedly committed since none of that information is entered on the e-ticket until after is electronically signed. Since the commissioner's rules indicate that an arresting officer's signature on a UTT “constitutes the affirmation of the information under penalty of perjury,” the absence of such a provision in the rules relating to e-tickets is troubling to the court.
Since the Criminal Procedure Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law defer in great measure to the Motor Vehicle Commissioner's rule making authority, the most expedient changes may be accomplished by amending the rules relating to e-tickets. Specifically, the rules should describe in detail the form of the ticket to make it clear that it is one-sided and in one color. The rules should set forth a type size and location on the e-ticket for notice with regard to how one may appear and answer a ticket as well as sanctions which may be imposed for failure to appear. More importantly, the rules should require that the last act by an officer issuing an e-ticket should be to click on an “I affirm” button on the computer which is preceded on the screen by a form notice which mirrors that on the simplified information that indicates it is “affirmed under penalty of perjury.” As Lt. Casper candidly admitted at the hearing, there is no reason why the software can't be re-programmed to accomplish such an affirmation.
